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Science of giants: China and India in the
twentieth century
JAHNAVI PHALKEY* AND TONG LAM**
Abstract. How might one tell the histories of China and India – two countries that have come
to be seen as twenty-ﬁrst-century giants? How might one tell of how they look to the world and
to each other? In this issue we juxtapose, connect and compare the two. Ours is an attempt at a
historiography of twentieth-century modernity in China and India beyond the encouragement
of Euro-American historiography. We seize this opportunity provided by the contemporary
engagement and concern with the two countries to reinterpret the narratives of their
twentieth-century transformation, which are far from settled at the moment. We bring histor-
ical knowledge to speak usefully to the excitement, anxiety and aspiration around science and
technology in China and India. We bring the same to speak meaningfully to the cynicism, ad-
monition and expectations that the world has of them. We use China and India as a method of
exploring new historiographical questions of science. We are invested in extending the rele-
vance of studying China and India to the world at large through connections, references and
juxtaposition, and by raising questions that, on the one hand, expose the limits of the Euro-
American experience and, on the other, open up the intellectual and historiographical space
for narratives and theoretical frameworks that are not tied to geopolitical signiﬁcance. This
paper sets out these issues and introduces the papers of the collection.
Not very long ago, Jack Goody, the anthropologist, posed a question: ‘How is it that
China and India, apparently without the development of “capitalism”, which was
Western, are now challenging the West for supremacy in so many ﬁelds?’1
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Not everyone is convinced of the challenge. Even when China and India are seen as
emerging powers, there are many different ways in which this challenge is described and
explained. Goody ﬁnds an explanation for the rise of at least China in the sameness and
overlap of Eurasian history in the early modern period.2 Others locate the beginnings of
this rise in the struggle for political and intellectual independence during the middle
decades of the twentieth century.3 Magazines such as Science andNature have dedicated
sections to China and India in the last decade to help their readers make sense of the so-
called rising science powers. The Royal Society published a report making clear that the
production of scientiﬁc knowledge had now gone global, and China and India were
places to watch.4 Historians of science responded too. Bernard Lightman, editor of
the history-of-science journal Isis, commissioned two Focus sections on China and
India. The journal did not carry any other country-focused section.5
We wish to seize this opportunity provided by the contemporary engagement and
concern with the two countries to reinterpret the narratives of their twentieth-century
transformation, which are far from settled at the moment. The middle decades of the
last century witnessed an intensity of transformation and a focus on industrialization
and economic growth that set both on the path to what has been called catching up.
Their own stories of the mid-twentieth-century origins of their current formation, the
silences on some aspects and the attentiveness to others, are of primary interest to us.
In this issue we juxtapose, connect and compare the two giants. Ours is an attempt
at a historiography of twentieth-century modernity in China and India beyond the en-
couragement of Euro-American historiography. We unravel histories and networks of
science and engineering through diverse practices, and we locate historical energies
that produced the modern in the two countries but on an international plane.
Writers at The Economist appear convinced of the long road that China must travel
before leading the world, but they enlist the projects that show why Goody can frame
China and India as challenges to the West:
The world’s largest single-aperture radio telescope, being built in Guizhou province, is due to
open in September. The Five-hundred-metre Aperture Spherical Telescope (Tianyan, in
Chinese) dwarfs all other such instruments … And it is expanding 25-fold its dark-matter-
2 For a more up-to-date analysis of how China and Europe contributed to the rise of capitalism see Kenneth
Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
3 Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia,
London: Penguin, 2003. Ramachandra Guha, Makers of Modern Asia, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2014.
4 Among others see ‘Science in India’, special in Nature, 13 May 2015, at www.nature.com/news/india-1.
17456. ‘The Chinese research paradigm: addressing global science issues’, sponsored supplement of Science
(19 December 2014) 346(6216). The Royal Society, Knowledge, Networks, and Nation: Global Scientiﬁc
Collaboration in the Twenty First Century, London: Royal Society, 2011, available at https://royalsociety.
org/∼/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2011/4294976134.pdf. All accessed 4 June 2016.
5 ‘Focus: science and modern China’, Isis (2007) 98(3), pp. 517–596; and ‘Focus: science, history, and
modern India’, Isis (2013) 104(2), pp. 330–380. The journal carried a region-focused section: ‘Focus: global
currents in national histories of science: the “global turn” and the history of science in Latin America’, Isis
(2013) 104(4), pp. 773–817. See also China, India, and the United States, special issue of Technology in
Society (2008) 30(3–4).
2 Jahnavi Phalkey and Tong Lam
investigating Jinping underground laboratory, in Sichuan province, making that the world’s
largest subterranean lab.6
India’s strength apparently lies elsewhere:
India has already had one technology revolution. In the 1980s middle-class engineers from a
dirt-poor socialist India somehow persuaded Western ﬁrms to outsource their back-ofﬁce func-
tions and bits of their IT operations to the subcontinent. Thus began a three-decade-long boom
… The cultural impact of all this has been huge.7
This was only a couple of years earlier when they covered the Indian Mars mission: ‘Its
Mars mission may be cheap by American (or Chinese) standards, at just $74 m, but
India’s overall space programme costs roughly $1 billion a year. That is more than
spare change, even for a near $2-trillion economy.’8
How might one tell the histories of these two countries that have come to be seen as
twenty-ﬁrst-century giants, of how they look to the world and to each other? How do we
bring historical knowledge to speak usefully to the excitement, anxiety and aspiration
around science and technology in China and India? How do we bring the same to
speak meaningfully to the cynicism, admonition and expectations that the world has
of them? We hope to use China and India as a method to explore new historiographical
questions of science. We seek to rethink India through China, China through India, and
aspects of global history through China and India.9 This is the leitmotif of our
collaboration.
Histories of both China and India as our generation of historians of science have
understood them – and we are no different – are mostly mediated throughWestern schol-
arship on the two, often in the English language. We came to this collaborative exercise
with that awareness and with substantial archival research behind us. Apart from the
rich historical detail, this issue’s main contribution is methodological; our goal is to ex-
periment with historiography and think of strategies to overcome this mediation at least
to some extent through the juxtaposition of China and India.
Our histories are of two nations, China and India. However, we begin not with their
stability but with their historical agency. Analytically, with our historical actors we work
with, against and beyond their ideas of nation. There are the politics of the subjectivities
of our historical actors, and there are the politics of our own subjectivities. Our project
might embody a global and deep collaboration, and this issue is the outcome of our spir-
ited conversations in Toronto, London, Beijing and Bangalore. Even as we wish to rescue
6 ‘Schrödinger’s panda’, The Economist, 4 June 2016, at www.economist.com/news/science-andtechnology/
21699898-fraud-bureaucracy-and-obsession-quantity-over-quality-still-hold-chinese, accessed 4 June 2016.
7 ‘The screen revolution’, The Economist, 13March 2016, at www.economist.com/news/business/21573551-
meet-next-generation-indian-technology-ﬁrmsand-obstacles-they-face-screen, accessed 4 June 2016.
8 ‘How can poor countries afford space programmes?’, The Economist, 4 November 2013, at www.
economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-0, accessed 4 June 2016.
9 Wang Hui, The Politics of Imagining Asia (ed. Theodore Huters), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2011. See also Kuan-hsing Chen, Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010; and Warwick Anderson, ‘Asia as method in science and technology studies’, East
Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal (2012) 6, pp. 445–451.
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histories from the nation,10 we remain acutely aware of the commitment of our historical
actors to the futures of these ideas and how residues of those remain also in our analyt-
ical apparatus.
We bring together histories of science and technology in China and India during the
twentieth century; we are not aware of a comparable effort. Among our ﬁrst goals is
to move beyond comparison. More often than not, comparisons tend to idealize one
and to essentialize both.11 We aim, instead, to juxtapose and connect in order to
think about China through India and India through China, to identify, as Bin Wong
would have it, the limits of Western experience and to locate the boundaries around
knowledge about the two countries – both, in their current formation, products of the
turbulent twentieth century. In turn we question and refocus on the received wisdom
about the twentieth century in general, and about science and technology in particular.12
This issue expands the historiographies of science and technology not merely to
include the experiences of the global South, but also to question the capability of
current historiography to address these experiences at all. We do not want to begin
from the canon of history of science to bring India and China into the fold. We begin
instead with listening to the concerns of our historical actors, what they call – often in-
distinguishably – science and engineering/technology. Even when such phenomena res-
onate with what scholars of science and technology studies (STS) have come to call
techno-science, we do not begin with given concepts. Our aim has been to create path-
ways to new concepts and tools to craft histories that make sense of experience, not as
measure or evaluation or assessment of those considered outside its norm.
Historians of Europe and North America often mistake the geopolitical signiﬁcance of
the regions they work on for the signiﬁcance of their work itself. A similar accusation
could be made of us: China and India are now seen as signiﬁcant global players.
There is no denying that the opportunity to publish a collection of this kind is a
product of our time. We would like to use this opportunity and the space it has
created to raise questions about what even makes a space like this possible. We would
like, in the continuation of our work, to understand the politics of this attention and
how that speaks to Chinese and Indian experience of science and technology.
Historiographies of science in China and India thus far have been, primarily, reﬂec-
tions on difference. Historiography of medicine, especially, has folded in with relative
ease into that framework. We believe ours is a slightly different task given that science
and engineering practices in the twentieth century seldom diverge into distinct ontolo-
gies as they do in medicine. Histories of Ayurveda and Chinese traditional medicine ﬁt
well within this larger framework of difference providing neat non-Western systems
10 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
11 Micol Siegel, ‘Beyond compare: comparative method after the transnational turn’, Radical History
Review (Winter 2005) 91, pp. 62–90; Abdelhamid Ibrahim Sabra, ‘Situating Arabic science: locality versus
essence’, Isis (1996) 87, pp. 654–670. See also the discussion of comparative studies in Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, ‘Rethinking comparativism’, New Literary History (2009) 40, pp. 609–626.
12 Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2000.
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that confront or encounter Western biomedicine. Scholars have written about these
complicated histories with increasing nuance; however, our problematic is placed
where historiography of medicine began to inform the framework also of science
and technology. History of science and technology in these countries and, arguably,
in the global South is often reduced to ontological confrontations with the assumption
that these are somehow not merely different but also incommensurable and at times
illegible.
Implicit in this conception and production of irreducible difference is also a notion of
potential sameness that seeks to violently transform social relationships and historical
processes into a universalizing narrative afﬁrming the superiority of Euro-American
accomplishments, especially in science and technology. That we continue to regard
Shenzhen as nothing but an oversized sweatshop even though it has become a hub of
global start-ups highlights the urgency of using China and India as conceptual sites to
rethink the history of science and technology. Spatial outcomes are temporally
mapped. China and India, no wonder, are always catching up.
On shared problematics and divergence
It is productive to think about twentieth-century China and India together, ﬁrst and fore-
most, because they have compared themselves to each other in the middle decades of the
twentieth century. Second, and equally important, political and industrial leadership in
the two countries puts science and technology at the heart of their transformation into
new regimes. Finally, both China and India operated in the global context of colonialism
and imperialism in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.
In this issue, we have explored some of this shared experience by locating the Indian
and Chinese abroad, especially in the West and in the Soviet Union where relevant. We
also locate the differentiated presence of the West in China and India. While the site
details tell different stories, we canmeaningfully identify the Chinese and Indian readings
of especially European history in the early half of the twentieth century, and of American
and Soviet history in the latter half. And we identify shared practices amid seemingly un-
bridgeable ideological divides.
To begin with, China and India were the Orient of the imperial age. As such, the twen-
tieth century saw political leadership in both countries set out decisively to overcome
that description with the desire to become equals among nation states of signiﬁcance,
while seeking to revive and reinvent their civilizational grandeurs. At the same time,
both had to come to terms with their respective relationship with the colonial question.
The Indian Empire was ruled by the British, and China was partially subjugated to
European and Japanese imperialist rules. In order to prevent future foreign conquest,
leaders of both countries felt compelled to embrace Western-style modernizing projects.
If China was closely aligned with the Soviet Union for the ﬁrst decade and a half after
1949, India was less committed at ﬁrst and realigned around the same time as the Sino-
Soviet rift to a non-aligned politics that emerged in 1955. Unsurprisingly, this early Cold
War era witnessed regular trafﬁc among scientists and engineers of the countries. Up
until the Sino-Indian border conﬂict of 1962, the two nations continued to cautiously
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share similar commitments to science, economic growth and the idea of social better-
ment. Both countries had to sustain very large populations while trying to achieve
speedy development. Both held ambitions to become global players in what was
largely seen as a binary geopolitical order of the Cold War. Above all, as we said
earlier, both had tremendous faith in science and technology as the key to nation-build-
ing projects. Nonetheless, military belligerence led to great distance and distrust when
compared to the exchanges and references they made to each other in the early
decades of Independence and the establishment of the People’s Republic.
Another signiﬁcant divergence between the two is their political systems. This aspect
of the two countries calls for a nuanced discussion that is well beyond the scope of this
issue. However, at least through the lens of science and technology, we ﬁnd that the di-
vergence may not be as pronounced, and at most times not along the fault lines of ideol-
ogy, as might be assumed to be the case.
The two nations also diverge on mobility. Until recently, many more Indian scientists
and engineers were travelling back and forth to the Euro-American world when com-
pared to their Chinese counterparts. As a result, the role of the diaspora has been signiﬁ-
cant in the development of science and engineering in India.13 In the 1980s and 1990s,
the belated inﬂux of a massive Chinese diaspora was still mostly related to investment in
the manufacturing sector. Nonetheless, the gap has been narrowed drastically in recent
years as a number of overseas Chinese scientists, in addition to returned students previ-
ously sent by the government, are working in China. Needless to say, the mobility of
experts, but also of ideas, practices and even capital, is central to our concern of focusing
on both global circulation and site-speciﬁcities in the rethinking of the history of science
and technology.
If for a signiﬁcant part of the twentieth century the Chinese and Indian agenda was to
implement big-science projects for economic growth, then that agenda has now been
supplemented by the call for innovation. In other words, compared to the differences in
political economy and manufacturing in the earlier period, state-led privatization – state
capitalism – in both countries since the late 1970s has brought them closer
ideologically and geopolitically. And even if planning and large-scale social-engineering
projects remain a part of the governing logic, we discover that contemporary science,
economic growth and social order are increasingly articulated in strikingly similar
terms of innovation, entrepreneurship and other new liberal initiatives.
Temporality
In many ways, the Euro-American past and present are the imagined futures of China
and India. This has been and continues to be heavily contested in both countries. If
13 Ross Bassett, The Technological Indian, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016; Bassett,
‘MIT-trained swadeshis: MIT and Indian nationalism, 1880–1947’, Osiris (2009) 24, pp. 212–230; Zuoyue
Wang, ‘The Cold War and the reshaping of transnational science in China’, in Naomi Oreskes and John
Krige (eds.), Science and Technology in the Global Cold War, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014, pp. 343–
370; and Devesh Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International
Migration from India, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
6 Jahnavi Phalkey and Tong Lam
modernity has already had its ‘authentic’ incarnation in Europe, how will it repeat else-
where but as an imitation? No wonder, then, that there has been an awareness in China
and India of being held up in this imaginary waiting room of history.14 In China, com-
munism was once thought a shortcut to modernity. What exactly they wanted to catch
up with or surpass has also shifted in the last seventy years: the goals have ranged from
excellence in research to GDP numbers.
The paths to catching up or to surpassing the West are not necessarily the same in
China and India but both have taken up science and engineering projects that could
be called the ﬁrst, the largest or the least or most expensive. Like resonances of modern-
ization theory, or at least its goals, we also ﬁnd innumerable references to the much-dis-
credited (by historians) yet still mobilized linear model that suggests that science,
economic development and democratic governance always come hand in hand. If we
follow this logic, then fundamental science, if properly funded, is supposed to yield eco-
nomic growth, which in turn would enable democracy. By the same argument, then, sci-
entiﬁc and economic progress cannot be secured without a free and open society. During
the Cold War, when this model was mapped onto these two ancient civilizations, we
were told that communist China needed to catch up with democratic India. In recent
years, as China has economically surpassed India, the narrative becomes that of India
catching up with China, prompting some Indian leaders to call for a more authoritarian
model of governance.
In spite of the repeated failure of modernization theory or the linear model to make
sense of the uneven development of the global South and the growing stagnation of the
global North, it continues to evoke strong support and argument among policy makers
and isolated academic quarters. Signiﬁcantly, we notice that many of our historical
actors, who operated under the global context of imperialism and national liberation,
have also failed – if they tried at all – to dislodge the powerful narrative of progressive
time that came with imperialism. Neither have they escaped from the essentialization
of spatial differences that underpins the epistemology of imperialism. This argument is
evoked in both China and India, where modernization was seen as a necessary formula
to avert the fate of being colonized. Nonetheless, in India there was the strong dissenting
voice of Mohandas Gandhi and his followers prior to Independence, an argument that
was strengthened and reﬁned again in the 1970s. In China, such a strong dissenting
opinion has largely been absent. Instead, Chinese leaders and intellectuals have been un-
relenting advocates of techno-scientiﬁc modernity, which is often manifested in unapolo-
getic forms of social-engineering intervention, urbanism and high-speed growth.
All said and done, this does mean that our historical actors simply accepted the power-
ful idea that there is such a thing as Euro-American superiority in science and technol-
ogy. Instead, they refracted and reﬂected on their work through a selective
appropriation of Euro-American ideas and practices to deﬁne their ambitions. In their
most recent formation of being part of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
grouping, their claim to become, to some extent, an aspirational model for parts of
14 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Science of giants 7
Africa and Latin America puts an end to any misguided idea of universal history. In this
issue, we examine both their rhetorical claims and their actions in equal seriousness.
Science and the state
We mentioned earlier that two polities diverged at their origin in the 1940s. What were
the manifestations of that divergence? One would expect to ﬁnd the most pronounced
manifestation in aspects that concerned the state, and in our case, state patronage of
science and technology.
China has a long history of sophisticated statecraft but civil and external wars limited
the role of the state in the institutionalization of science in the early half of the twentieth
century. Nonetheless, science ﬂourished in what have been called semi-colonial spaces
such as Beijing and Shanghai.15 In India, the British Indian government established im-
perial institutions to produce useful knowledge and this laid the foundations for some of
the administrative and institutional infrastructure that would be developed in India after
Independence.
It was in the post-war era that the pursuit of large-scale technocratic solutions to social
problems gained momentum. We ﬁnd that ‘directed research was not incompatible with
doing good science and that state patronage was not synonymous with state control’.16
China and India, alongside the Soviet Union, exemplify this scale for our discussion.
They belong together in a way that is actually not that different from the Cold War nar-
ratives of divergence and convergence between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Furthermore, to the extent that the state functions as a ﬁeld of knowledge and power,
as Timothy Mitchell puts it, science and technology are very much part of the practices
that are at the very foundation of the idea of the modern state and state power.17 Our
studies similarly conﬁrm that in spite of their differing political systems, big-science
and large-scale engineering projects in both countries were pivotal to the reiﬁcation of
the bureaucratic nation state. Our collaboration therefore highlights the importance of
following ‘science in action’ in the globally connected processes of state making and
state transformation.18
Prospectus
Western imperialism did not only imagine Chinese and Indian cultures as exotic and in-
compatible – the two countries were mapped onto a hierarchical framework of
15 For a discussion of how early twentieth-century China was a laboratory of modernity see Tong Lam, A
Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900–1949, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2011. See also Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire,
Development, and the Problem of Scientiﬁc Knowledge, 1870–1950, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2011.
16 John Krige, ‘Concluding remarks’, in Oreskes and Krige, op. cit. (15), pp. 431–441, 431.
17 TimothyMitchell, ‘Society, economy and the state effect,’ in George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture: State-
Formation after the Cultural Turn, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 76–97.
18 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
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difference. The massive body of writing on the history of Chinese science and medicine
by the British sinologist Joseph Needham is one such example. Leon Rocha shows that in
order to include China and India in the history of ‘universal medicine’, Needham had to
place the two countries within an existing and primarily European history of science and
technology based on a schema of difference. For example, Needham contended that
China was ‘proto-scientiﬁc’ and that India was even less scientiﬁc. Such an approach,
relegating the scientiﬁc knowledge of non-Western societies to the status of proto-
science or ethno-science, and holding Western science as science, on the one hand has
failed to appreciate the Chinese and Indian histories of science and medicine on their
own terms, and on the other has neglected the crucial ways in which non-Western
worlds participate in the production of scientiﬁc knowledge both conceptually and em-
pirically. This latter aspect is taken up by Fa-ti Fan and John Mathew, who illustrate
how the local worlds were used to construct respective knowledge of natural history
for the British Empire and of the Chinese nation in the early twentieth century. In
short, they show that imperial frontiers, rather than being backward, were the laborator-
ies of science and circuits of knowledge.
If the so-called peripheral spaces were central to the formation of the empire’s self-
knowledge, one also sees how the ﬂip side of this logic played out within the new
Chinese and Indian nation states in the post-war era. In their study of endangered
snow leopard and contemporary conservation politics, Michael Lewis and E. Elena
Songster explain how restricted border zones between the two nations have rendered
snow leopards concentrated in the region largely invisible in the two countries’ national
scientiﬁc and geographical imaginations. Subsequently, unlike ‘Chinese’ pandas and the
‘Indian’ tigers that are surrounded by national rhetoric, snow leopard conservation has
mostly been driven by domestic and international NGOs.
Just as differences in geopolitical space have given rise to different narratives of natural
history and conservation science, Pin-Hsien Wu too argues that contemporary concep-
tions of nature and environmental politics diverge in these two countries precisely
because of their speciﬁc historical and sociopolitical circumstances. Based on two
cases of ‘coal capitals’, Wu’s discussion of pollution reminds us of the widespread eco-
logical devastation and human toll behind these industrial undertakings in the name of
development.
Whereas coal conjures up the massive industrial undertakings in post-war China
and India, agricultural modernization as envisioned by United States scientists
seems to take on a softer image. As Madhumita Saha and Sigrid Schmalzer argue,
United States experts and engineers championed their notion of ‘green revolution’,
which highlighted the depolitical and technocratic nature of their interventions as
opposed to the ‘red revolution’ of communism. Nonetheless, instead of just focusing
on technological transfer, the authors trace the practices of science and emphasize the
important role of Chinese and Indian scientists in shaping the imported techno-scientiﬁc
model.
In a similar vein, Jahnavi Phalkey and Zuoyue Wang tackle the practice of top-down
intervention by examining the early history of comprehensive ﬁve-year plans for science
and technology based on the Soviet model of national planning. Here, too, they remind
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us that China and India had plenty of common challenges and concerns, as well as
shared inspirations and aspirations, that have often been overlooked by the rhetoric
of the Cold War. Diganta Das and Tong Lam, meanwhile, analyse how China and
India have moved considerably beyond the earlier practice of planning and arrived at
a whole different kind of ‘green’ development in the new era of global capitalism.
Speciﬁcally, they show that a global network of science parks that are consistent with
the logic of transnational capital in recent decades has replaced the heavy-industrial
zones of the Cold War era as the new growth engines. They further contend that these
science parks, more than just a space for science, are often marketed as utopian living
spaces for urban elites in the larger neoliberal symbolic economy.
As science is used to envisage new urban space and mould middle-class consumer sub-
jects, science ﬁction is key to our common imagination of the future. In their conversa-
tion about the place of science ﬁction in the histories of science and technology in China
and India, Anna Greenspan, Anil Menon, Kavita Philip and Jeffrey Wasserstrom play-
fully reverse the trope of ‘catching up’ and contend that China and India are hardly back-
ward. Drawing on examples of speculative ﬁctions and a range of cultural practices, their
conversation challenges the prevailing cultural narrative of a unitary and linear notion of
progress, and raises the prospect that places such as Bangalore and Shenzhen, rather than
Silicon Valley, are at the forefront of innovation.
This issue takes the interactions within the global South seriously. Arunabh Ghosh’s
study of the South–South scientiﬁc exchange between China and India in the history
of statistics is one such example. By decentring the Soviet Union and the United States
as the sources of scientiﬁc knowledge, he reveals an alternative history of statistical
science that would otherwise be buried in the binary logic of the Cold War. Also, the
global South is not a territorial concept. Asif Siddiqi further illustrates why spatial dy-
namics of scientiﬁc knowledge production are not about simply shifting to China and
India as our research location. The production of scientiﬁc knowledge as examined by
Siddiqi was situated in a global network of sites that involved the village of Thumba
in the southern tip of India; the MIT campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts; the
Chinese Academy of Science in Beijing; and the Soviet city Dnepropetrovsk. In sum, sci-
entiﬁc ideas do not just circulate, but are generated in the very process of circulation and
global collaboration.
Coda
In the end, what has emerged from our conversations and papers is a reassuringly con-
tingent history against a set of global imperatives such as the Cold War, empire, nation-
alism, socialism and capitalism. People, ideas, artefacts move around in an unpredictable
manner. Political claims are more distinct than the processes they purport to draw their
conclusions from or to represent. These claims often remain unresolved. And sometimes
they are resolved in unexpected ways.
In both China and India goals and aspirations far exceed any realistic assessment of
capability. There is, as George Perkovich puts it, an entitlement to greatness that both
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seem to exhibit.19 This preoccupation with a sense of greatness, however tenuous, is
invested with great passion in both. At the heart of this passion is the desire to question
the self-conﬁdence of the claim around the rise and supremacy of the West. The speciﬁc
claim to greatness comes from reference to a civilizational history that allows both, to
some extent, to overcome the politics, at least at home, of being geopolitically superseded
by the West.
One tension, therefore, at the heart of any attempt to write contemporary history of
these two giants that are poised to change the world is, on the one hand, the claim to
enduring earthly presence, to long unbroken historical processes. On the other hand, at
the same time as they both speak from a deep historical past, they also claim to have
become rapidly changing and advancing nations that have been completely trans-
formed during the twentieth century. Their political systems are now homologous
with the world system of nation states, and their economies are inseparable from the
global economy. Both narratives have power, even as both are only partially accurate.
Our focus on the twentieth century has opened up this very space, when the two nar-
ratives come into their own, allowing us to unsettle both – the ideas of enduring trad-
ition and the entitlement to greatness that nationalism has afforded both China and
India. When, in China, the political leadership travels from the Ming dynasty to the
space age without a breath in between, the twentieth century, the troubled century
of difﬁcult transformation for both, is brushed over. Political leadership in India is
now beginning to do the same. In this issue we open up aspects of precisely that difﬁcult
transformation.
Science and technology in China and India during the twentieth century, like else-
where, are about social change, economic growth and even national survival. We are
aware that there is today a politics to imagining especially China and, to an extent,
India: it is the politics of potential accompanied by fears of their divergence. It is our
hope to have shown that the geopolitical statuses of countries are not self-evident frame-
works, nor do they provide useful analytical categories for historical work. We are inter-
ested in speciﬁcity, and it is this very commitment to speciﬁcity that stops us frommaking
generalized observations about the global South. At the same time, we are invested in
extending the relevance of studying China and India to the world at large through con-
nections, references and juxtaposition, and by raising questions that, on the one hand,
expose the limits of the Euro-American experience, and on the other open up the intel-
lectual and historiographical space for narratives and theoretical frameworks that are
not tied to geopolitical signiﬁcance.
19 George Perkovich, ‘The measure of India: what makes greatness?’, in Seminar: The Monthly Symposium,
at www.india-seminar.com/2003/529/529 george perkovich.htm, accessed 4 June 2016.
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